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CHARLES WILLIAm LEAPHART
A "Use" resembling closely both the use as it existed prior
to the beginning of the fifteenth century, and the use upon a use
employed during the period between the passage of the Statute
of Uses in 1536 1 and the case of Sambach v. Dalston in 1634,2
if we may correctly call any of these "uses", is still frequently
employed in circumventing statutes. In the first period mentioned
the use was not recognized by the law courts and it was not until
somewhere between 1397 and 1403, according to Maitland, 3 and
as early as the reign of Henry V (413-1422) according to Ames,
4
that the chancellors began to enforce it. In the second period
the statute of uses did not execute a use upon a use, and during
that period, as Dean Ames has indicated, the chancellors did not
enforce the second use.5 - Such a use must then have led the same
sort of existence as did the original use in the first period. Al-
though this was apparently a precarious contrivance to employ,
yet it had considerable vigor for, as Professor Scott has pointed
'27 HENRY VIII, c. IO (I535).
'Tothill 188 (1820).
"3 MAITLAND, COLLECT PAPERS (1911) 273.
'AmES, LLcruREs ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 237. Note the following:
"The first decree for a cestui que use, whenever it was given, was the birth of
the equitable use in land. Before that first decree there was and could be no
doctrine of uses. One might as well talk of the doctrine of gratuitous parol
promises in our law today."
°'ibid. 243-247.
(253)
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out, Parliament had to interfere to prevent its employrnpnt for
purposes too obviously opposed to the prevalent conception of
public policy," as, for instance, to defraud creditors, 7 to hinder
disseisees for recovering land 8 and in 1391 it was necessary
to extend mortmain statutes, whereby land conveyed to religious
and other charitable corporations was forfeited to the overlord,
to cases where land was conveyed to individuals for the use of
such corporations.9
A class of statutes for the circumvention of which the scheme
is still largely used resemble the ancient mortmain acts in that
they restrict or limit a testator's power to devise or bequeath to
charitable corporations, or societies, or to any person or persons
in trust for charitable purposes. Generally the limitation is on a
devise or bequest in a will executed within a certain period prior
to the death of the testator. Sometimes provisions look to the
further protection of members of the family, as for example,
those in New York legislating against a devise or bequest "of
more than one-half of the estate of the testator or testatrix over
and above the payment of debts, liabilities and expenses, in case
he or she shall have a husband, wife, child, or parent him or her
surviving". 10 As in the early period mentioned, the court will be
neutral with respect to the "use". Since these statutes cover
trusts, to be successful, the testator must be careful not to employ
that successor to the ancient use. He must also be careful to stay
outside the present boundaries of the doctrines of constructive
trusts. On the other hand, he must touch the conscience of the
devisee or the legatee in order to have him do his" will. lust
as before the year 1400, or 1391 to make the analogy complete,
it behooved the grantor to be careful in the selection of his feoffees,
so now it behooves the testator using this scheme to be most
careful in the selection of his devisees or legatees. Due to the
6 Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform (1022) 31 YALE L. J.
457, at 458 et seq.
5o EDW. III, c. 6 (r376).
8 i Rich. II, c. 9 (1377).
15 RicH. II, c. 5 (1391).
"See General Municipal Laws of New York, § 146, N. Y. Cons. LAW.
(Cahill, Supp. i93o) ioi9. Cf. Decedent Estate Law of New York, § 17, N. Y
CoNs. LAWS (Cahill Supp. I930) 558.
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neutral attitude of the courts the devisee or the legatee may keep
the property for his own use in violation of the confidence that
has been placed in but not communicated to him in the lifetime of
the testator.
The method by which the testator whose death appears to be
approaching within the limited period, can successfully accomplish
his purpose is to select a thoroughly honest devisee or legatee, leave
the property to him by will without mention of a trust, and take
care that after his death the devisee or legatee shall learn for the
first time that he is to dispose of it for the desired charitable pur-
poses. The testator can be open and above board about the scheme.
His lawyer can and should carefully explain the details to him and
may suggest a fitting devisee. It may be perfectly clear to the
court that the parties were contriving to defeat the purposes of
the statute. Such indeed were the facts in Schultz's Appeal,"
and yet the court did not think that it could defeat the scheme
although the devisee testified in court that he would consider him-
self bound by the testator's wishes. The devisee could, if he so
desired, change his mind and keep the property, as the court held
that the devise was free of the trust. In Flood v. Ryan 12 the tes-
tator bequeathed and devised his property to St. Teresa's Church
and St. Joseph's House for Industrious Boys but provided that in
case of his death within thirty days it should go to the Arch-
bishop of Philadelphia. The Archbishop testified that no com-
munication had ever been made to him by the testator but indicated
that he would prove true to the trust. Further, by reason of his
oath as bishop and his office he would be under obligation to hold
the property for church purposes at least, if not for the purposes
which the testator desired. The court held that the bishop took
the property absolutely.
The failure of the testator's adviser to explain carefully that
the legatee corporation, of which the adviser was an officer, could
keep free and clear was fatal to the success of the scheme in one
case. In In re Stirk's Estate 13 the facts showed that the testatrix
'8o Pa. 396 (1876). See also in accord Flood v. Ryan, 22o Pa. 450, 69 Atl.
9o8 (io).
ISuiqra note ii.
2232 Pa. 98, 8z At. 187 (igii).
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had been informed by an officer of a trust company that if she
died within thirty days the bequest for certain charitable purposes
would fail. The officer had prepared in advance a codicil which
provided that in case the bequest should fail that the property
should go to blank. The testatrix had the officer put the name
of the Trust Company, in the blank. It was clear that there
could be no reason why she should want to leave a bequest abso-
lutely to this business organization. The court stressed the fact
that there was no evidence that the trust officer had carefully
apprised the testator that the trust company could keep the property
as its own if it is so desired. That apparently helped the court to
reach the conclusion that there was an implied understanding
that the property should be held on trust and therefore the bequest
was void.
In Geddis v. Semple 14 the testator drew up his will leaving
property to three persons as tenants in common, having learned
that bequests and devises would fail if he bequeathed and devised
for charitable purposes. He did this after consulting with one
of the trustees who suggested one of the two other trustees as
being perfectly reliable. The trust was not communicated to these
two until after the testator's death. The court held that there
was a resulting trust with respect to that proportion which was
bequeathed to the tenant in common who had been consulted but
that the portions to the two who had no knowledge, vested in
them absolutely even though they intended to carry out the inten-
tions of the testator.
In Durkee v. Smith 15 the testator devised and bequeathed
property to named trustees, such trustees to form a corporation
to hold property on certain charitable trusts. Then in a separate
clause he provided that in case any devise or bequest be invalid
that part should go to these named trustees absolutely, and not as
trustees. The court said that while it undoubtedly-appeared from
the entire will that the testator desired that the property be devoted
to charity, nevertheless it was not sufficient to prevent the devises
" [1903] Ir. R. 73.
M 171 App. Div. 72, I56 N. Y. Supp. 920, 218 N. Y. 61g, 112 N. E. 1057
(1916), rehearing 219 N. Y. 657, 114 N. E. io66 (1916).
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and bequests from being absolute. The court did not disturb the
lower court's findings that there was not sufficient external evi-
dence to show a secret understanding and therefore affirmed the
judgment in favor of these named persons.
A California case "G has carried the doctrine so far as to hold
valid a bequest where one of the legatees informed the testatrix
that it would fail should she leave it to them on trust or to them
as park commissioners. Whereupon the testatrix said, "I will
leave it to you absolutely", to which the legatee responded, "You
can do that if you wish". In her will the testatrix related that she
had abandoned her desire to leave it for charitable purposes and
desired to leave it to the named legatees absolutely. The court
stated that the fact that the legatees had, after the death of the
testatrix, executed a declaration of trust for the charitable purpose
which testatrix desired, made no difference in the result; the prop-
erty was theirs absolutely and they could do as they pleased. In
this latter case an implied promise to hold in trust might well have
been found.
In all the preceding cases it appears that the party received
the property under such circumstances that in good conscience he
should not keep it for himself. In a period of strict law when the
scope of the law activities was narrow there might well be a justi-
fication for judges closing their eyes to what was actually going
on. But where there is a conscious legislative endeavor to pre-
vent property being left to charity under certain conditions it
would seem that these courts have not been sufficiently liberal
with respect to the doctrines of constructive trusts.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has reached what seems
to the writer a preferable result. In Gore v. Clark ' it appears
that the South Carolina statute made illegal and void a devise
or bequest by a testator of more than one-quarter of his property
"O'Donnell v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 625, i2o Pac. lO76 (I912), cited with
approval in In re Holts Estate, 61 Cal. App. 464, 215 Pac. 124 (1923).
1737 S. C. 537, 16 S. E. 614 (892). In connection with thebe cases under
discussion see Kendrick v. Cole, 61 Mo. 572 (1876) ; Matter of the Will of
O'Hara, 95 N. Y. 4n" (TRS) ; Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, i51 N. Y.
282, 45 N. E. 876(1897) ; Fairchild v. Edson, 154 N. Y. 199, 48 N. E. 541 (1897) ;
Scott, Conveyances on Trsts Not Properly Declared (i923) 37 HARv. L. REv.
653, at 671 et seq.
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to his bastard children. It further appears that the testator, after
leaving one-fourth of his property to such children, had left the
balance to a person upon whom he could depend to carry out his
desires. The fact that he wanted this property held in trust for
his illegitimate children was not communicated to this devisee
and legatee until after his death; there was no doubt as to the
fact that the testator made the arrangements in this way so as to
evade the law in question. At the suit of one of the heirs and
next of kin, the court ordered the executor to pay over the prop-
erty to the heirs and next of kin.
There is a further note of dissent to the prevailing doctrine
in the latest pronouncement of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in a case in which the point was directly involved. In In re Bick.-
ley's Estate iS the court felt that it was bound to follow Schultz's
Appeal 19 because of the number of Pennsylvania cases that had
followed it, and because of the further fact that twenty-five ses-
sions of the legislature had not changed the law. The court, how-
ever, said that if the question were an open one it would take the
opposite view, and in a severe criticism gave five reasons:
i. The decisions made valid admitted attempts to evade the
law.
2. The law was applied to those within the letter and not
within the spirit, and not to those cases within the spirit
but not within the letter.
3. Devisees and legatees were tempted to commit a moral
wrong by keeping for their own uses.
4. Lawyers, contrary to their duty to obey the law in spirit,
were tempted to advise their clients how to evade the law.
5. Courts were tempted to seize on slight circumstances to
create a trust with illogical distinctions as a result.
20
This pronouncement by a court which has had a long experience
with the doctrine might well serve as a warning to jurisdictions
S8270 Pa. iOI, at pages 1o4, lO5, lo6, 113 Atl. 68, at 69, 70 (1921).
Supra note 1i.
Referring to Stirk's Estate, supra note 13; Russell v. Jackson, Io Hare
2o4; Edson v. Bartow, 154 N. Y. 199, 48 N. E. 541.
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which have not as yet passed upon the question. It must, how-
ever, be admitted that there are difficulties in the way of reaching
the desired result. The rule is well established that if property
is left by will to a devisee or legatee with no trust indicated, and
the testator intends that he shall hold in trust for another but
without communication of that intention to him in the lifetime of
the testator, the devisee or legatee will take free of the trust. To
impose a constructive trust upon him for the intended beneficiary
would, it seems, violate the spirit of the statute of wills. It
would, of course, leave wide open the possibility of vesting the
equitable interest in property effectively at the death of the testator
without an instrument properly attested. It has also been sug-
gested by Professor Scott 21 that it would violate the spirit to
impose it for the benefit of the heirs or next of kin. 2  In In re
Boyes 23 the legatee promised to hold personal property in trust
for such person as the testator named in a letter to be given him.
This letter was never given to him but was found among the
papers of the decedent. The legatee was willing to hold upon
trust. The court imposed a constructive trust for the benefit
of the next of kin; Professor Scott approves this case.2 4  It is
submitted, however, that the spirit of the statute is not violated
in one case more than the other; that the only question is whether
it is unconscionable from the point of view of equity for a devisee
or legatee to keep that which comes to him by the will when he
knows that he is not intended to keep it. The majority of courts
are in agreement that if the devisee or legatee has promised the
testator that he will hold in trust for another that a constructive
trust will be imposed for the intended beneficiary. Professors
Scott 25 and Costigan 20 have excellent articles on the cases,2 7
taking differing views as to whether it should be for the heirs or
next of kin, or for the intended beneficiary. To the majority of
'For a collection of cases see an article by Austin W. Scott, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 678, n. 69.
Ibid. 678.
=26 Chan. Div. 531 (1884).
"1 Scott, loc. cit. supra note 22.
Ibid. 67o.
Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Be-
quests, Devises, or Intestate Succession (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rnv. 237, 366.
"'For a collection of cases see Scor, CASES ON TRUSTS (1919) 458, n. 2.
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the courts it seems unconscionable for the devisee and legatee to
keep under those circumstances, but to date they have not seen fit
to extend the doctrine to the case we have been discussing. In
view of the fact that many courts have not yet reached a point
where they will impose a constructive trust on one who murders
a testator and profits by his untimely death, and in the light of
such cases as Kent v. McHaffey 28 where the Ohio court refused
to impose a constructive trust on a legatee who thwarted a blind
testator's desire to revoke a will by purporting to burn it in the
presence of the testator, and Bohleber v. Rebstock 29 in which
the Illinois court stated the remedy was with the legislature, ap-
parently unconvinced that a constructive trust might be imposed
on two sons who prevented access by lawyers and others to their
feeble and infirm father and thus prevented the revocation of his
will, one may be justified in believing that it will be some time
before a court will impose a constructive trust on a devisee or
legatee who has taken no hand in procuring the devise or legacy
and whose only wrongful act, if it could be so called, is in keeping
that which was not meant for him.
Granted, however, that the courts are correct in refusing to
impose a trust in the simple situatiori mentioned above, it by no
means follows that the same view must be taken when the devike
is used to accomplish a purpose forbidden by the legislature. While
keeping the property under these added circumstances will be no
more unconscionable than before, yet the court which looks the
situation squarely in the face cannot help but see that any ordi-
nary self-respecting man will prove true to the confidence imposed
in him if the property is given to him absolutely, and that unless
a constructive trust for the heirs and next of kin is imposed, the
statutes can be easily circumvented. The number of cases which
have already reached the courts of last resort indicate a compara-
tive widespread knowledge of how to evade these legislative pro-
visions. The doctrine of constructive trusts has not crystallized
within the bounds set by Kent v. Mahaffey nor Bohleber v. Reb-
io Ohio St. 2o4 at 220-222 (1859).
9255 Ill. 53, 99 N. E. 75 (1912).
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stock 30 nor by those courts which refuse to impose a constructive
trust upon a profiting murderer. 31  It may well be that other
courts will follow the view of Gore v. Clark 32 and the one sug-
gested as preferable in Bickley's Estate.
33
The problem is further complicated by reason of the fact
that there are at least three other methods which apparently can
be used to accomplish the same purpose. The first is the creation
of a revocable trust by a conveyance inter vivos; the second, the
use of a power; and the third, the use of precatory instead of man-
datory words.
From the viewpoint of the person seeking to evade the
statute the first method seems preferable to the scheme which is
most frequently used, if one may judge frequency of use from
the frequency of litigated cases. One may transfer property
upon trust reserving to himself the life interest therein and the
power to revoke in whole or in part and thus obtain what amounts
in substance to a testamentary disposition of the property yet the
courts will not treat the conveyance as testamentary. 34 Care
should be taken to reserve the right to revoke in whole or in part
since the power to revoke the entire trust does not carry with it
the right to revoke in part 3' and there should not be such control
over the trustee as to make him simply an agent.36 But with
this power to revoke in whole or in part there is no doubt about
the ultimate control of the grantor. Until the time of his death
he is in the saddle with respect to his property.
In general the statutes which we have been discussing in their
terms cover only devises and bequests so that the trust device
appears outside their scope. 37  The use of the trust would seem
o Supra notes 28 and 29.
For cases contra see also Sco-r, loc. cit. supra note 27.
= Supra note 17.
Supra note 8.
*'Leaphart, The Trust as a. Substitute for a Will (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 626.
'National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128
At. 586 (1925).
' Leaphart, op. cit. supra note 34, at 629, and cases cited in n. 18 of same.
' Note however that in Pennsylvania the Act of July 7, 191x, P. L. 702, § I
covers not only bequests and devises of property but also conveyances to char-
itable uses. It does not seem that the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, § 27
has repealed this provision as to conveyances, although it includes in its terms
only bequests and devises of property to charitable uses.
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safe in that we have a trustee, whose duties the courts will enforce.
The creator of such a trust would not have to take the chances
of a devisee or legatee who might be unfaithful to his moral
obligations. That this device was deliberately and successfully
used in California for the benefit of Bowdoin College appears
in the case of President, etc. of Bowdoin College et al. v. Merritt
et al.38 The statutes of California in effect made invalid a devise
or bequest for charitable purposes of more than one-third of the
property of a testator leaving legal heirs.30 The testatrix intended
to make a will but was advised of this difficulty and so made a deed
of trust reserving a life interest and possibly controlling the in-
vestment and management. 40  The court held that the disposition
of the property was by deed and hence did not violate the statute.
The use of a power also seems safer than the modern use
previously discussed. Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State
University 4' is a case which shows how a lawyer testator success-
fully made use of the power. Section 5915 of the Revised Statutes
then in force in Ohio 42 provided in substance that if a testator
died leaving issue of his body his devises and bequests for chari-
table purposes were void unless the will were executed more than
one year prior to his death. The testator devised all his real
property to Ohio State University subject to a life interest in his
wife and daughter. He then provided that in case, and only in
case the devise should fail for any cause, the property should go
to two sons of his brothers. Then followed these provisions: 4z
"I now provide and declare that my said daughter is
fully authorized and empowered to ratify and confirm said
devise and bequest to the said university in case of my death
within a year from the date of said will, and she is desired and
requested by me to do so.
"In case she complies with this request the devises and
bequests to the said children of George Folsom and Charles
Folsom are hereby revoked."
3375 Fed. 480 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896); dismissed 167 U. S. 74q, 17 Sup.
Ct. (96 (1896); 169 U. S. 551, I8 Sup. Ct. 415 (1898).
6 Ibid. 483.
'Ibid. 484.
* 7o Ohio St. 92. 7o N. E. 896 (1904).
'For pertinent sections of statute see ibid. at 99, 7o N. E. at 898.
'Ibid. at 94, 70 N. E. at 897.
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The testator died within one year after the execution of the
will. The court held that the daughter had a valid power and the
exercise of it cut off the estate of the nephews; the testator's
purposes were thus accomplished. It will be noted that by this
device the donor may so arrange it that the donee of the power
will not profit if he fails to carry out the wishes of the testator.
In In re Keleman's Will the testatrix made use of the third
method. In the instrument she made bequests to certain charitable
institutions which would be invalid. Four days later she made
a codicil reading as follows:
"Doubts having arisen as to the validity of the bequests
made for charitable purposes in my said will I hereby modify
said will dated February i8, 1889, by making my friend
Townsend Wandell my residuary devisee and legatee, and
hereby request him to carry into effect my wishes with
respect thereto; but this is not to be construed into an abso-
lute direction on my part, but merely my desire." 44
The view of the court indicated the following:
"It is true that the expression of a wish or a desire may
sometimes serve to found a trust or effect a charge, but such
expressions are by no means conclusive. We must still
examine the will to discover the testamentary intention.
Phillips v. Phillips, i i2 N. Y. 205, 19 N. E. Rep. 411. In
the present case the testatrix expressly guards against a mis-
taken interpretation. She says that the expression of her
wish is not to be construed as an absolute direction; by which
she evidently means, that while she desires that her resid-
uary legatee shall deal with the charities as she would have
been glad to, yet she does not mean to fetter his ownership
or qualify his right. She leaves him absolutely owner, and
free to -do as he shall choose. She puts upon him no obliga-
tion, legal or equitable, but contents herself with the bare
expression of a wish which she hopes will influence his free
agency; and so the bequest was absolute, and therefore valid
on the face of the %611.- -
In order to accomplish his desire by this method it is apparent
that the testator will have to select carefully his devisee or legatee,
i6 N. Y. 73, 74,26 N. E. 968, 969 (i8g).
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and he should also be careful as to communications to the devisee
or legatee prior to his death. Thus in Fairchild v. Edson 46 the
court followed In re Keleinen's Will, but as to a third of the
property sustained the lower court's findings that there was a secret
trust by reason of an implied understanding on the part of one of
the three trustees that he would hold in trust for the desired
charities.
With our courts continuing to handle legislative material as
they do it seems a fairly easy proposition to evade these statutes
dealing with devises and bequests to charities by any one of the
four methods. The trust inter vivos and the power seem the
safest.
Returning now to the discussion of the modern use, the field
of its employment is larger than the evasion of this one class of
statutes. It is also of importance in evading the estate or suc-
cession taxes of those states in which trusts created inter vivos
with the creator reserving a life interest are held subject to the
tax." Before the case of May v. Heiner 's it seemed useful for
the purpose of evading the Federal Estate Tax. In Nichols v.
Coolidge ' the grantors of a trust apparently had this in mind.
They conveyed residence property worth $274,ooo to their chil-
dren by absolute deed. The children leased back to the grantors
at a nominal rental with provisions for renewal until notice to
the contrary. "All parties understood that renewals would be
made if either lessee wished to occupy the premises." Under these
circumstances one might think that the courts would impose
a constructive trust in favor of their parents in case the children
proved unfaithful to their trust, but American courts have almost
unanimously refused to impose a constructive trust- in case of
an absolute deed upon an oral trust for the grantor.50 Probably
40Suprn note 17.
" People v. Taverner, 30u Ill. 373, 133 N. E. 211 (i92I); Moore v. Bugbee,
128 Atl. 679 (N. J. I925) ; In the matter of Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47
N. E. 292 (1897) ; In the matter of Cornell, 17o N. Y. 423, 63 N. E. 445 (1902) ;
Re Dobson's Estate, 73 Misc. 170, 132 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1911) ; Dubois Appeal,
121 Pa. 368, 15 Atl. 641 (1888); Re Todd's Estate, 237 Pa. 466, 85 At. 845
(I912) ; Note (1926) 75 U. oF PA. L. Rav. i68.
" 28r U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286 (193o).
"274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (I926).
See Scott, op. cit. supra note 17, at 658.
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for this reason the Supreme Court felt no uncertainty in reaching
the conclusion that this property should not be included in the
estate of the grantor for purposes of the estate tax. At any
rate the court did not discuss what effect the reservation of a
life estate in 1917 would have.
1fay v. Heiner 5' has apparently made it unnecessary to take
the chance of an unfaithful trustee. The court in this case, in
reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals Z2 held that the value of
properfy conveyed by a grantor upon trust for her husband for
life, then to herself for life, then to be distributed among her
children was improperly included in the estate for purposes of
the tax irrespective of whether the husband predeceased her. The
lower federal court had held '3 in line with the majority of
the state courts 54 that such trusts were to be included. The
opinion of the Supreme Court, citing Reinecke v. Nortiern Trust
Company '5 as though it were controlling, is very inadequate and
perhaps leaves the question doubtful. At any rate the scheme is
still useful with regard to state inheritance taxes.
Without purporting to exhaust the field of employment of
this ancient scheme, the two instances, the frequent use of it
for the evasion of testamentary laws, and the apparent use of it
for the purpose of evading inheritance taxes, at least causes the
query as to whether the courts have not failed to extend construc-
tive trust doctrines as far as they might wisely do. In any event,
it must be admitted that the "use" of the Fourteenth Century. or
a creature most closely resembling it, and with its weaknesses, is at
the present time a very handy contrivance for circumventing
legislation.
" Supra note 48. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, has so under-
stood May v. Heiner in deciding in McCaughn v. Carnill, 43 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A.
3d, 1930), that a person may make an actual gift reserving a life interest to
himself without subjecting the property on his death to the Federal Estate Tax.
5232 F. (2d) 017 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
'Reed v. Howbert,.8 F. (2d) 641 (D. Colo. x925) ; McCaughn v. Girard
Trust Co., ii F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ; Bradley v. Nichols, 13 F. (2d)
857 (D. Mass. 1926); May v. Heiner, 25 F. (2d) ioo4 (W. D. Pa. 1928), 32
F. (2d) IOI7 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
'" Supra note 47.
rz 278 U. S. 339, 347, 348, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 125, 126, annotated 66 A. L. R.
397 (929).
